We examine the role of institutional investors in affecting governance of companies by analyzing institutional holdings in firms from 23 countries during the period [2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008]. We find that institutional investors play a role in improving firm-level governance over time. Most interestingly, our results suggest that it is changes in institutional ownership over time that drives changes in firm-level governance but the reverse does not hold. Foreign institutions are the drivers of governance improvement outside of the U.S., while domestic institutions play a predominant role for U.S. firms. The legal origin of the institution matters with institutions from common-law countries (i.e., high shareholder protection) being more effective in promoting governance improvements worldwide than institutions from civil-law countries (i.e., low shareholder protection). We also find that domestic institutions play the most important role in improving governance in common-law countries, but it is foreign institutions and institutions domiciled in common-law countries that play a crucial role in improving governance in civillaw countries. Our results suggest that institutional investors promote the convergence of corporate governance regimes around the world. JEL: G32, G34, G38
Introduction
Institutional holdings have been rising around the world but we know little about the influence of institutions in corporations worldwide. Gillan and Starks (2003) highlight the special role that institutional investors, in particular foreign institutions, play in prompting change in corporate governance practices in many countries. Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that foreign institutional ownership is positively associated with firm value and performance outside of the U.S., but there is no direct evidence that foreign investors are able to change the governance of a firm. Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson (2009) find evidence of a good governance premium for non-U.S. firms, but the evidence so far has not supported the view that corporate governance regimes are converging worldwide (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) ).
In this paper, we investigate whether international portfolio investment can contribute to the convergence of corporate governance across countries. We examine the role of institutional investors from many different countries in affecting the governance structure of companies worldwide. We investigate the role of both domestic and foreign institutional investors.
Particularly, we are interested in studying whether institutional investors export good governance internationally and whether they are responsible for the convergence in global governance mechanisms. We also analyze whether the type of institutional investors matter with a special focus on their legal origin in an attempt to address the question: Do institutional money managers from countries with better investor protection "export" good governance practices through their investment decisions overseas? Similarly, we also examine the country-level legal regime of the firm that receives institutional investment. Firms located in countries with a weak legal regime are likely to benefit more from institutional investment, particularly from institutions located in countries with strong legal regimes. For example, U.S. corporate boards are relatively small and most firms had a majority of "independent" directors even before recent regulations made this a requirement. U.S. institutional investors could potentially influence firms overseas to move in this direction either directly by influencing the management and using voting rights ("voice"), or indirectly by their decisions to buy or threat to sell their shares ("voting with their feet"). 1 Firm-level aspects that institutional money managers can affect include the adoption of financial disclosure and auditing standards as well as opposing the adoption of anti-takeover provisions.
To illustrate how the origin of the foreign institutional money manager can matter, consider a company based in a civil-law country, say Germany, which is owned by two institutional investors, one from France and the other one from the U.K. France scores lower than the U.K. according to most country governance indicators (investor protection, quality of institutions, etc). Presumably, the French institutional investor will be less willing to change the firm-level governance of that German firm than the U.K.-based investor. The Economist (2008) provides anecdotal evidence that foreign shareholders, in particular those based on the U.K., tend to lead the changes in governance of German firms. An example is that of TCI (The Children Investment Fund) that forced the management of Deutsche Börse in 2005 to abandon a takeover of the London Stock Exchange and led to the resignation of both its chief executive and the board of the supervisory board. 2 Becht, Franks, and Grant (2008) provide related evidence on the hedge-fund investor activism in Europe.
1 In the theoretical model developed by Giannetti and Koskinen (2008) , domestic and foreign investors' participation in the stock market should be lower in countries with weak investor protection. They also conclude that domestic portfolio investors are less likely to participate in the local market and will hold more foreign equity, when investor protection is weak. 2 Another example, but for a different country, is TCI's role in the takeover of ABN AMRO, the Dutch Bank, which was initiated by an open letter to ABN AMRO proposing five resolutions aimed at forcing the bank to spin off its different lines of business and which then lead to bids by foreign banks (Economist (2007) ).
We examine the relation between firm-level institutional holdings and corporate governance attributes in 23 countries between 2003 and 2008 . The focus of our study is on non-U.S. companies, but we also repeat our analysis including U.S. companies. The sample includes about 2,000 non-U.S. firms and 5,000 U.S. firms in a given year. We use 41 governance attributes collected by RiskMetrics (formerly Institutional Shareholder Services). RiskMetrics is the leading proxy advisory firm in the world and its recommendations wield considerable influence in determining corporate voting outcomes (Alexander, Chen, Seppi and Spatt (2008) ).
Following prior literature (e.g., Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson (2009)) we create a governance (GOV) index that provides a firm-level governance measure that is comparable across countries. One can reasonably disagree both with the governance attributes included and the computation of the index. However, if the index were to convey no information, we would simply find that the index we use is not related to institutional ownership. We believe that our 41 firm-level governance attributes include most of the attributes studied in the literature.
We find a strong positive relation between firm-level governance and institutional ownership. We also provide evidence that foreign investors play a predominant role in helping to improve firm-level governance over time of non-U.S. corporations. U.S. institutions, and more generally institutions based in common-law countries (where there is strong protection of minority shareholder rights) are the main drivers of the improvement in governance outside of the U.S., while institutions based in civil-law countries are not.
The legal origin of the firm also matters. We find that domestic institutions play a significant role in improving governance of firms located in common-law countries, while in civil-law countries the main driver of better governance is foreign institutions. Likewise, we find that domestic institutions have a predominant role in the sample of U.S. firms. Overall, our analysis shows that the legal environment of the institution and firm affects the efficacy of monitoring by institutional shareholders.
The relation between institutional ownership and firm-level governance raises a few issues that are typical in empirical studies of governance. First, institutional ownership might be related to some observed and unobserved firm characteristics that explain governance. To address this omitted-variable problem, we control for observed firm characteristics in our regressions. Also, we use a firm fixed-effects method that controls for unobserved sources of firm heterogeneity. The positive relation between institutional ownership and governance remains robust.
Another concern is the fact that institutions might be attracted to firms that have higher governance (the endogeneity problem). Investors domiciled in strong legal environment countries could systematically avoid firms with weak governance from countries with a poor legal environment (Kim, Sung and Wei (2008) and Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2008) (2002)), antitakeover amendments (Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) ), executive compensation (Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2005) ), and M&As (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) and Chen, Harford and Li (2007) ). Bushee, Carter and Gerakos (2008) find evidence of ownership by government-sensitive institutions to be associated with future improvements in shareholder rights. Recent papers look at activism by individual funds, such as pension funds or hedge funds (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas (2008) and Klein and Zur (2008) The second strand focuses on the value relevance of firm-level corporate governance. 4 In the U.S., authors have shown that firm value is related to indices of firm-level governance (e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) , Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) , Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) ). Outside of the U.S., Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson (2009) examine the relation between governance and firm value and conclude that minority shareholders benefit from governance improvements. Also, in an international setting, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) show that non-U.S. firms cross-listed on a U.S. exchange differ in governance from other firms in the same country and have higher value. Durnev and Kim (2005) use the CSLA corporate governance ratings and demonstrate that they are value relevant. Francis, Khurana, and Pereira (2005) find that disclosure-related governance attributes affect firms' cost of capital across the world. Dahya, Dimitrov, and McConnell (2008) present evidence that shows firm value is positively related to board independence for those firms located in countries with weak governance and with governance problems. M&A activity is larger in countries with better accounting standards and shareholder rights, while cross-border transactions frequently target companies in countries with low shareholder protection (Rossi and Volpin (2004) , Bris and Cabolis (2008) ).
Our paper provides new evidence of a direct link between institutional ownership, in particular by foreign institutions, and corporate governance practices in a large sample of countries. More importantly, our results suggest that institutional investment helps to improve firm-level governance and not the reverse. To our knowledge, we are the first to provide evidence that international portfolio investment promotes good governance and contributes to the convergence of corporate governance regimes across countries.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we describe the firm-level corporate governance attributes, the institutional holdings data, and other firm-specific variables. In Section 3, we examine the relation between institutional investment and firm-level governance.
Section 4 analyzes the relation between the role of institutions in common-law versus civil-law countries. Section 5 examines whether institutional investors drive changes in governance or vice versa. In Section 6, we present some alternative specifications and robustness checks. Finally Section 7 concludes and provides a discussion of the implications of our findings.
Data
In this section, we describe the sample of firms and data used in this study. We examine the relation between institutional ownership and governance for the 2003-2008 period. We are able to obtain firm-level institutional ownership, corporate governance, and control variables for firms from 23 countries. As shown in Table 1 BoardEx is the leading database on board composition and compensation of publicly listed firms, and includes detailed biographic information on individual executives and board members of approximately 10,000 firms in nearly 50 countries. These data have been used previously in Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) to study educational links between CEOs and mutual fund managers in the U.S. and in Ferreira and Matos (2008b) to study board links between banks and firms worldwide. For the remaining few observations still missing, we use the same value as of the previous year.
Firm-Level Governance
As shown in Figure 1 and Table 2 shows the average of the yearly percentage change in GOV 41 for each country.
For every country, except New Zealand, on average, the governance score has increased.
Overall, corporate governance practices have improved around the world over our sample period.
Some of the largest positive changes have been in the Sweden (4.9%), Netherlands (4.5%) and U.K. (4.3%). In the U.S. particular firm-level governance attributes were mandated after the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2003.
Institutional Ownership
We use Table   3 . On average, the lowest institutional ownership is for firms in New Zealand (9.5%), Portugal Table 3 shows that domestic institutions account for more than half of institutional ownership in several countries including U.S. (87%), U.K. (70%), Canada (60%), Sweden (60%), and Denmark (53%). But in most countries, holdings of foreign-based investors exceed domestic institutions. The more extreme cases of large foreign ownership are for firms in small countries such as, Ireland (95%) and New Zealand (92%). In 11 of the 22 international countries, institutions based in common-law countries hold more than 50% of the local stock market capitalization. This is true both for firms located in common-law countries such as, U.K, Canada, and U.S., and also for firms located in civil-law countries, such as the Netherlands, that seem to attract investment from institutions whose management companies are based in common-law countries.
Firm Characteristics
The data for firm characteristics for non-U.S. firms is obtained from
Datastream/Worldscope, and the data for U.S. firms is obtained from Compustat. The variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. We use several firm-specific control variables in our regressions: log of total assets (ASSET), debt to assets (LEV), dividend yield (DYIELD), whether a firm is listed as an ADR (ADR), two-year annual sales growth (SGROWTH), cash holdings to assets (CASH), capital expenditure to assets (CAPEX), market to book (MB), R&D to assets (R&D), return on assets (ROA), property, plant and equipment to assets (PPE), foreign sales to total sales (FXSALE), number of analysts following a firm (ANALYST), and percentage of shares closely held (CLOSE). The variables that are defined as ratios (LEV, SGROWTH, CAPEX, MB, R&D, ROA, and FXSALES) are winsorized at the upper and lower 1% level. Appendix B provides a detailed description of the variables used in the study.
Institutional Ownership and Governance
The literature has documented a positive relation between governance and firm value (see, for example, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) In an attempt to examine the determinants of better governance, as a first step, we examine the role played by institutional ownership.
We use the governance index, GOV 41 , for each firm as the dependent variable. The explanatory variable of interest is institutional ownership. All independent variables are lagged by one year so that we can examine the relation between the explanatory variables and future governance. Therefore, if GOV 41 is for period t then each of the independent variables is for period t-1. Consistent with the literature, we include several firm-level control variables that have been shown to be related to governance, as described in the previous section. As an example, SIZE is included because larger firms have been shown to have better governance. The argument is that there are economies of scale in investing in governance, therefore it is easier and less costly for larger to invest in governance compared to smaller firms. Industry and country characteristics have also been shown to affect the investment in firm-level governance. To account for industry and country sources of heterogeneity, we include industry and country fixed effects in every regression. Earlier we have shown a positive trend in governance over time.
Therefore, we also include year fixed effects to account for the time trend. We correct standard errors for clustering of observations at the country level. Table 4 show a strong positive association between total institutional ownership and governance. In addition, firms that have ADRs, firms that are better performing (higher ROA), growth firms (higher MB), firms that have higher leverage (higher LEV), and firms followed by more analysts have better governance. In contrast, the coefficient on the percentage of shares closely held is negative and significant. As expected, if a higher percentage of shares are closely held, the governance is weaker (Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2008)). In many countries, insiders hold a large fraction of the shares. These controlling shareholders have to trade off the private benefits of control versus the investment in firm-level governance which also benefits minority shareholders (Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller and Stulz (2008) ). The explanatory power of the model is high with an R 2 of 0.73.
Next, we examine whether the positive relation between governance and institutional ownership is being driven by the nationality of the institutional investor. The literature has found some evidence on the differential role of domestic versus foreign-based institutions. For example, Ferreira and Matos (2008) find that foreign institutional ownership, unlike domestic institutional ownership, is positively related to firm valuation and performance outside of the U.S. Column (2) uses institutional ownership by domestic investors (IO_DOM) as the main explanatory variable; Column (3) uses foreign ownership (IO_FOR); and (4) includes both domestic and foreign ownership in the same regression. The relation between domestic institutional ownership and governance is positive and significant as it is the relation between foreign institutional ownership and governance as can be seen in columns (2) and (3). However, when we include both domestic and foreign institutional ownership in the same model (column (4)), foreign institutional ownership is positive and significant while domestic institutional ownership is insignificant. These results establish a strong positive relationship between institutional ownership and governance. Outside of the U.S., foreign institutions seem to be particularly important in improving governance. Later we explore the role of foreign versus domestic institutions in more detail.
We isolate ownership by U.S.-based institutions and also find a strong positive relation with governance (column (5)). This is indicative of important played by institutions originating from the U.S., a country where the average governance score of firms is high (see Table 2 ). As a more general test, we condition institutional ownership on the legal regime of the country of origin of the institutional money managers. We classify institutional investors based on whether they are domiciled in common (IO_COMMON) or civil (IO_CIVIL) law countries. Column (6) (column (7)) uses ownership by institutions domiciled in common-law (civil-law) countries, while column (8) includes both. We see that coefficients for ownership by institutions from both common and civil-law countries are positive and significant. However, when IO_COMMON and IO_CIVIL are both included in the same regression, only the coefficient on common ownership is positive and significant. We conclude that there is a strong positive association between firmlevel governance and the "governance at home" of institutional investors holding a firm's stock.
This is indicative that institutions may be responsible in "exporting" good governance around the world. Foreign institutions, in particular those that come from countries with strong shareholder protection, seem to be the main vehicles of the convergence of corporate governance regimes around the world.
The Role of the Country's Legal Regime
The legal system of the country where a firm is headquartered can influence the role that institutional shareholders can play. For example, an institution's ability to monitor the firm by means of voting rights can be limited by certain features of the legal and regulatory environments (Gillan and Starks (2003)). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that investor protection and corporate governance are stronger where the legal system is based on common-law as opposed to civil-law. Therefore, we estimate our panel regressions with governance as the dependent variable, separately for firms located in common and civil-law countries. We expect to find that the role of institutions, especially foreign ones, in prompting governance changes is stronger in civil-law countries. Panel A (Panel B) of Table 5 reports the results for firms incorporated in civil-law (common-law) countries. All estimations include industry, country and year fixed effects and standard errors are corrected for countrylevel clustering.
As shown in Table 5 , we find that the coefficient for total institutional ownership is positive for governance in firms based in both civil and common-law countries (columns (1) of Panel A and (5) of Panel B). The most interesting finding is that domestic institutional ownership is the main driver of better governance in common-law countries (column (8)), while in civil-law countries the main driver of governance improvement is foreign institutional ownership (column (4)). Indeed, the foreign institutional ownership coefficient is positive and significant in civil-law countries in column (4). In contrast, the domestic institutional ownership coefficient is even negative.
This is evidence that domestic institutions are associated with good corporate governance only if there is a strong overall legal environment in place. In civil-law countries, domestic institutions do not appear to be linked to good governance practices. This could happen because domestic institutional money managers are more likely to have business ties to local corporations, to share the benefits of control, and to be more sympathetic to incumbent management (Gillan and Starks (2003) , Stulz (2005) , and Ferreira, Massa and Matos (2008) ). In contrast, foreign institutions can better exert pressure over local management. 
Does Institutional Ownership Drive Changes in Governance?
The results so far show a strong positive association between institutional ownership and firm-level governance. We have also shown the differences in the role of foreign versus domestic institutional investors depending on the legal regime of the country in which the investment is made. However, one might be concerned that in the causality runs from institutional ownership to governance, but that firms with expected governance improvements attract this class of investors. In order to address the direction of causality, in this section, we study the relation between changes in institutional ownership and changes in governance. Table 6 reports the results with changes in the governance index as the dependent variable and (lagged) changes in institutional ownership as main explanatory variable. The dependent variable ∆GOV 41 is the change in the governance index from period t to t-1. The explanatory variable, ∆IO_TOTAL is the change in total institutional ownership from period t-2 to t-1. All the other independent variables are also expressed in terms of change and are lagged one period relative to the governance index.
The results show that the coefficient on total institutional ownership (column (1) of Table   6 ) is positive, but only significant at the 10% level implying that an increase in total institutional 9 For example, mutual fund families may be reluctant to engage in activism at firms that they may take as future clients for corporate-sponsored pension plans (Davis and Kim (2007) ). Also, recent evidence from Sweden suggests that domestic pension funds affiliated with controlling shareholders limit a firm's openness to the market for corporate control (Giannetti and Laeven (2007)).
ownership leads to an increase in firm-level governance. The positive relation is more significant for change in foreign institutional ownership, ∆IO_FOR (column (3)), and change in institutional holdings from U.S.-based money managers, ∆IO_US (column (4)) and common-law based money managers, ∆IO_COMMON (column (5)). Changes in domestic and civil ownership are also significant. However, the coefficient of ∆IO_DOM is only significant at the 10% level and the coefficient of ∆IO_COMMON is almost three times larger than the coefficient of ∆IO_CIVIL.
Overall, these findings suggest that an increase in institutional ownership leads to improved governance. But foreign institutions and institutions domiciled in countries with strong legal regime seem to make more of a difference in improving governance.
In unreported regressions, we also run this analysis in the reverse direction with change in governance as the explanatory variable and change in institutional ownership as the dependent 
Robustness and Additional Tests
In this section, we present our efforts to address potential concerns associated with omitted-variables and endogeneity in our analysis. These problems are ubiquitous in empirical research on corporate governance. This problem is accentuated by recent findings showing that U.S. investors avoid firms with governance problem when investing overseas (Leuz, Lins and
Warnock (2008)).
We first address the potential omitted-variables problem using firm fixed effects that control for unobserved sources of firm heterogeneity. Fixed-effects methods solve "joint determination" problems in which an unobserved time-invariant variable simultaneously determines both governance and institutional ownership. It is also equivalent to looking only at within-firm changes in institutional ownership. Table 7 presents the firm fixed effects estimates (with t-statistics adjusted for countrylevel clustering) using our different proxies for institutional ownership. There is still evidence of a positive relation between governance and institutional ownership. Moreover, only foreign, U.S.
and common-law institutional ownership are significant at the 5% level, which confirms our prior findings that these type of institutions are central to governance improvements outside of the U.S. Because only the effects of within-firm changes in governance are taken into account, firm-specific omitted variables cannot explain the observed relation between governance and institutional ownership. An issue here is whether there is enough variation in institutional ownership and governance over the short sample period in our study so that one can estimate this relation with precision. The short answer is yes; although t-statistics are usually lower, suggesting a lower precision in the estimates, they are still quite high by traditional standards.
As we discussed, in order to address issues related to the endogeneity of the institutional Column (5)- (8) of Table 8 present the coefficients of the second-stage regression that uses governance GOV 41 as the dependent variable. There is evidence of a positive relation between governance and foreign and U.S. institutional ownership after taking into account the possibility that institutional ownership is endogenous. Interestingly, we do not find a similar relation between governance and domestic institutional ownership. The evidence supports our previous findings that there is a causal link between institutional ownership and governance and that foreign institutions are the main force of governance improvement outside of the U.S.
Our conclusion here is twofold. Omitted variables are unlikely to explain the relation between institutional ownership, and in particular foreign-based ownership, and governance.
And we also find evidence consistent with a causal effect from institutional ownership to governance.
Finally, in Table 9 , we report our base results including also U.S. firms in our tests.
Specifications in Panel A of Table 9 follow those of Table 4 where we have looked only at the sample of non-U.S. firms. Our sample increases more than three times in these regressions meaning that the sample is now largely drawn from U.S. firms. The results show that including U.S. firms significantly increases the importance of domestic institutional ownership (column (4)) as expected based on our results from common-law countries in Section 4. We find a similar pattern in Panel B of Table 9 where we implement tests on changes as those of Table 6 but now the sample includes U.S. firms. Overall, the results in Table 9 and in previous sections are consistent with the idea that U.S.-based institutions are among the most active promoters of good governance practices, in particular, in their home market, but also around the world.
Conclusion
We find that institutional investors promote good governance practices around the world.
In particular, foreign institutional investors and institutions from common-law countries are the main promoters of good governance outside of the U.S. The results are particularly strong for the sample of firms located in civil-law countries. Our results also suggest that it is changes in institutional ownership over time that drives changes in firm-level governance, but the reverse is not true. Our findings indicate that international portfolio investment contributes to the convergence of corporate governance regimes across countries. International portfolio investment is particularly effective in improving governance when the legal environment of the institution's origin country is better than the one of the firm's destination country.
To our knowledge, we are the first to establish a direct link between international portfolio investment and actual adoption of good corporate governance standards by companies that promote corporate accountability and empower shareholders. We also shed light on the issue of whether institutions are simply attracted to firms with stronger governance or whether they also play a role in improving governance. Our paper complements indirect evidence in previous studies that monitoring by institutional investors leads to higher company performance. We also extend previous studies of shareholder activism that focus on a single country, institutional investor, and class of investors by showing that activism travels beyond country borders. Foreign institutions take a role in shareholders activism that local institutions seem not to be able to take. U S A C a n a d a U K F r a n c e G e r m a n y S w i t z e r l a n d I t a l y S p a i n N e t h e r l a n d s S w e d e n F i n l a n d B e l g i u m N o r w a y D e n m a r k G r e e c e A u s t r i a I r e l a n d P o r t u g a l J a p a n A u s t r a l i a H o n g K o n g S i n g a p o r e N e w Z e a l a n d U S A C a n a d a
F r a n c e G e r m a n y S w i t z e r l a n d I t a ly S p a in N e th e r l a n d s S w e d e n F i n l a n d B e lg i u m N o r w a y D e n m a r k G r e e c e A u s tr i a I re la n d P o r tu g a l J a p a n A u s tr a l ia H o n g K o n g S i n g a p o r e N e w Z e a l a n d F r a n c e G e r m a n y S w it z e r la n d I t a ly S p a in N e t h e r l a n d s S w e d e n F in l a n d B e l g iu m N o r w a y D e n m a r k G r e e c e A u s tr i a I r e l a n d P o rt u g a l J a p a n A u s tr a li a H o n g K o n g S i n g a p o r e N e w Z e a l a n d The table shows estimates of regressions of corporate governance on institutional ownership and other control variables. Our sample is non-US. firms. The dependent variable in each regression is the governance index (GOV 41 ) for each firm. The independent variables are five different proxies for institutional ownership: total institutional ownership in the company (IO_TOTAL), ownership by domestic institutions (IO_DOM) and foreign institutions (IO_FOR), ownership of U.S. institutions (IO_US), ownership by institutions domiciled in common-law countries (IO_COMMON) and civil-law countries (IO_CIVIL). The firm-specific variables are as described in Appendix B. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Therefore, GOV 41 is as of time t and the explanatory variables are at time t-1. Robust t-statistics adjusted for country-level clustering are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) The relation between corporate governance and institutional ownership is examined separately for civil-law (Panel A) and common-law countries (Panel B). Our sample is non-US. firms. The dependent variable in each regression is the governance index GOV 41 . The independent variables are different proxies for institutional ownership: total institutional ownership in the company (IO_TOTAL), ownership by domestic institutions (IO_DOM) and foreign institutions (IO_FOR). The firm-specific variables are as described in Appendix B. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Robust t-statistics adjusted for country-level clustering are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Change in corporate governance from t-2 to t-1 is regressed on change in institutional ownership from t-1 to t and change in other control variables. Our sample is non-US. firms. The independent variables are (lagged) changes in: total institutional ownership (∆IO_TOTAL), domestic ownership (∆IO_DOM), foreign ownership (∆IO_FOR), ownership U.S.-based institutions (∆IO_US), and ownership by institutions domiciled in common-law (∆IO_COMMON) and civil-law (∆IO_CIVIL) countries. The other firm-specific variables are also in (lagged) changes. Robust t-statistics adjusted for country-level clustering are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
(1) The table shows estimates of regressions of corporate governance on institutional ownership and other control variables using firm fixed effects. Our sample is non-US. firms. Variables are defined as in Table 4 and described in Appendix B. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Robust t-statistics adjusted for country-level clustering are reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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